We introduce bids in a rent-seeking contest. Players compete for a prize. Apart from exerting lobbying efforts, they also submit a bid which is payable only if they win the prize. We show that our model has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, in which each active player submits the same bid, while the sum of all efforts equals that bid. In equilibrium there is underdissipation of rent.
Introduction
In many economic situations, a number of contestants try to obtain some prize or rent. Several mechanisms can be used to assign a prize to one of the competitors. One obvious way is through a regular auction. Contestants then submit a bid and as a rule the one submitting the highest bid obtains the prize, and pays an amount that depends in some pre-described way on the total vector of bids. In the simplest case, a first-price sealed bid auction, the highest bidder pays his own bid, whereas the others pay nothing. For a recent survey of this literature, see e.g. Klemperer (1999) . In the case of policy decisions, the parties involved often exert effort in an attempt to influence the decision process. As is common in the rent-seeking literature, this effort can take the form of lobbying, but can also consist of bribes. Such a process can be modelled as an all-pay auction or a rent-seeking contest. In an all-pay auction (see e.g. Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries, 1993) , all contestants have to pay for their effort, and the one with the highest effort wins the auction. In a rent-seeking contest, all players also exert some effort, but the prize that are active, whereas players with a relatively low valuation are not. We further show that in the equilibrium (a) each active player submits the same bid, (b) the sum of all efforts equals that bid, and (c) there is underdissipation of rent. We compare our results with those in the standard rent-seeking contest and briefly examine in a numerical example the relation between the degree of asymmetry of the valuations of the prize and the number of active players in the equilibrium. In Sects. 4 and 5, we consider two special cases that allow us to explicitly solve for the equilibrium: the case in which all players have the same valuation, and the case in which there are only two contestants. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
There are n > 1 given players trying to obtain some prize. Player i values the prize at v i > 0: We thus allow for asymmetric valuations. Different from the auction literature, but consistent with the rent-seeking literature, we assume that the valuations v i are common knowledge. Each player i can submit a bid b i ! 0, and spend effort e i ! 0: The bid b i only has to be paid if i wins the prize. However, effort outlays e i are sunk. A player cannot retrieve these, regardless of whether or not he wins the prize. The probability p i that i wins is given by the logit form contest success function p i ðb 1 ; . . . ; b n ; e 1 ; . . . ; e n Þ ¼ b i e i P n j¼1 b j e j ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n; ð1Þ if b j > 0 and e j > 0 for at least one j; and p i ¼ 0 if that is not the case. In that way, we capture the idea that there is a trade-off between bid b i and effort e i ; and that both a positive bid and a positive effort are necessary to have a positive probability of winning. 2 Notice that @p i =@b i ; @p i =@e i ! 0; and @p i =@b j ; @p i =@e j 0 (j 6 ¼ i). Also note that these probabilities sum to unity.
3 Given (1), player i maximizes his expected payoff, given by 2 If one were to use a success function in which efforts and bids are perfect substitutes (i.e., in which efforts and bids appear additively), then in equilibrium players always choose zero efforts, as efforts are sunk, whereas bids are only paid in case of success. Clearly, this is a less interesting case. We therefore use the multiplicative specification in (1).
3 This is true as long as at least one player both submits a positive bid and exerts a positive effort. We assume that the contest is cancelled, i.e. the prize is not awarded at all, if there is no such player.
if b j > 0 and e j > 0 for at least one j, and P i ¼ 0 otherwise. This expression reflects that the bid only has to be paid if the player wins the prize, whereas the effort outlays are non-refundable. In a standard rent-seeking model, only some effort e i is exerted. The expected payoff in the basic version of this model equals
For instance, Hillman and Riley (1989) analyze this model, allowing for n contestants and asymmetric valuations. Our model can be seen as a generalization of this approach. We refer to Skaperdas (1996) , and Kooreman and Schoonbeek (1997) for a general discussion of the foundations of logit form contest success functions in rent-seeking models. Note that, in our analysis, we explicitly do not take the objective of the seller into account. As is common in most 4 of the rent seeking literature, we simply take the functional form of the contest as given, and derive the equilibrium behavior of participants in the contest.
Solving the Model

Introduction
In this section, we solve our basic model. In Subsect. 3.2, we derive the equilibrium. Then, in 3.3 we give some intuition for the main characteristics of our result. We discuss the extent of rent dissipation in 3.4 and compare the results of our model with the standard rent-seeking model in Subsect. 3.5. Finally, the effect of asymmetry in valuations is studied numerically in 3.6.
Equilibrium
In this subsection, we look for an equilibrium in pure strategies for the model described in the previous section. Without loss of generality, order valuations such that v 1 ! v 2 ! Á Á Á ! v n . In equilibrium, not every player necessarily submits a positive bid and effort. There are circumstances in which a player i is better off setting b i ¼ e i ¼ 0; and earning zero expected payoff. We will describe such a player as inactive.
To derive our main result, we need the following continuous auxiliary functions: 
Theorem 1:
In the model (2) with n > 1 players, whose valuations are given by v 1 ! v 2 ! Á Á Á ! v n ; there is a unique equilibrium ðb b 1 ; . . . ;b b n ; e e 1 ; . . . ;ê e n Þ. There is some player k ð2 k nÞ, such that in the equilibrium every player j with v j ! v k is active, whereas the other players (if any) are inactive. With bðmÞ the unique root of the function h m ðbÞ as defined in (4), with m ¼ 2; . . . ; n, we have:
Proof: See the Appendix. (
The unique equilibrium has a number of interesting implications. First, all active players submit the same bid bðkÞ, regardless of their valuation. This implies that, in equilibrium, differences in success probabilities of active players are solely determined by differences in the effortsê e i : Second, the bid bðkÞ every active player submits, equals the sum of total efforts. Third, that bid is strictly increasing in the size of the valuations of the active players: @bðkÞ=@v i > 0, 8i ¼ 1; . . . ; k: This can be seen from (i) of Theorem 1 and (4). Fourth, equilibrium bid and efforts are linear homogeneous in valuations: if all valuations are multiplied with the same factor, then the equilibrium bid and efforts all are multiplied with this factor as well. Fifth, we haveê e 1 !ê e 2 ! Á Á Á !ê e k > 0. Thus, the higher the valuation of an active player, the greater the effort he exerts. Sixth, p p 1 !p p 2 ! Á Á Á !p p k > 0; which follows from the fact thatp p i ¼ê e i =bðkÞ. Thus, the player with the highest valuation also has the highest probability to win the prize. Seventh, a player with a higher valuation also has a higher expected payoff: 
Interpretation and Intuition
As we showed above, all equilibrium bids are equal, while the sum of all efforts equals that equilibrium bid. These are surprising results. In this subsection, we try to provide some intuition and explanatory remarks as to why that is the case in our model. First note that, from (2), we can rewrite the expected payoff of player i as the difference between revenues and (expected) costs: P i ¼ p i ð:Þv i À p i ð:Þb i À e i . In our specification, b i and e i appear symmetrically in the revenue term p i ð:Þv i : This implies that if player i maximizes his expected payoff, in the optimum the two cost terms must be equal:
This equality is easy to interpret. The probability that player i wins the contest is given by p i : Only if he wins, he has to pay his bid b i : He always has to pay his effort e i : Hence, the LHS of (5) gives the expected costs of bidding, whereas the RHS gives the expected costs of exerting effort. In the optimum, these two have to be equal. From (1), we have that when evaluating (5), we need b i b i e i ð Þ= P j b j e j ¼ e i . In equilibrium, we therefore needb b
Since the RHS of this equality is identical for all players, we necessarily have that the equilibrium bidsb b i are equal for all players as well. Given that equilibrium probabilities have to sum to 1, (5) then immediately implies that the sum of equilibrium efforts equals the equilibrium bid.
More formally, consider problem (2) of player i. For simplicity, assume that all n players are active. Define the score of player i as x i b i e i : The probability of winning the contest is then determined by i ; s own score, relative to that of all the other players. We can now consider the problem in which player i uses the two instruments x i and b i , rather than the instruments b i and e i , as we had above. This allows us to rewrite the decision problem of player i as
provided that P j6 ¼i x j > 0: We can rewrite this as
where the functions f i ð:Þ and gð:Þ are defined in the obvious way. Note that f i differs across individuals, but g is identical for all players. Also, b i is not an argument of f i : The first-order condition @P i =@b i ¼ 0 now simply reduces to @gð:Þ=@b i ¼ 0, which implies that the equilibrium b i is equal for all players. In general, any contest success function that can be written in the form (7) has this property. Intuitively, in such a case, (2) can be interpreted as a two-stage problem. First, players determine the value of the score x i : Given all those scores, the probability of winning is already determined. Then, players decide how to divide their score between e i and b i . This is merely an issue of minimizing costs, which yields the same b i for all players. In this particular case, it is given by
Rent Dissipation
Next, we consider the extent of rent dissipation that occurs in equilibrium.
To study this issue, we need a definition of rent dissipation in the context of our model. Usually, it is defined as the total sum of efforts of the contestants trying to obtain the prize. Yet, in our model, there is also a bid bðkÞ paid by the winner. Arguably, this should not be counted as rent dissipation, since it merely consists of a transfer from the winner of the prize to the authority selling the prize. On the other hand, it is often argued that effortsê e i consist of bribes rather than efforts. Since bribes are also merely transfers, then if bribes are counted as dissipated rent, winning bids should also be. We therefore consider both possibilities. First, suppose that the winning bid is considered as dissipated rent. Total dissipation then equals D ¼ P jê e j þ bðkÞ. Using Theorem 1, it follows that D ¼ 2bðkÞ < v k . Thus, in this case there is always underdissipation of rent: total rent dissipation is less than the size of (even) the smallest valuation of the prize among the active players. If we do not consider the winning bid as dissipated rent, then total rent dissipation, D 0 say, satisfies
Again there is always underdissipation of rent.
A Comparison with the Standard Rent-Seeking Model
It is of course interesting to see how our results relate to those in a standard rent-seeking model (3). For that, we compare our results with those derived by Hillman and Riley (1989, pp. 30-35) for the standard rent-seeking model (3) with the same n players and valuations v 1 ! v 2 ! Á Á Á ! v n as in our model. Hillman and Riley characterize the unique pure strategy equilibrium of their model, and show that in the general case with asymmetric valuations it might occur that in the equilibrium not all n players are active. 6 Using their results, it easily follows that in equilibrium, the higher the valuation of an active player, the higher his effort, probability to win, and expected payoff. Moreover, if not all players are active, only those with the largest valuations will be. As discussed above, these properties also hold in our model.
In the following result, we use hats to denote equilibrium values in our model, and asterisks to denote equilibrium values in the standard model. Also, defineÊ E ¼ P jê e j and
We focus on the case in which all n players are active in both models. We then have:
Corollary 1: Comparing our model with bids to the standard model without bids, we have the following: (a) The sum of equilibrium efforts in the model without bids is higher than that in the model with bids, but less than twice as high: E E < E Ã < 2Ê E: (b) For each individual player, equilibrium effort is lower in the model with bids than in the model without bids:ê e i < e Ã i for i ¼ 1; . . . ; n: (c) Players with the smallest (largest) valuation have a smaller (higher) probability to win in the model with bids than in the model without bids:p pðv 1 Þ < p Ã ðv 1 Þ;p pðv n Þ > p Ã ðv n Þ: (d) Total rent dissipation in the model with bids is lower than in the model without bids when the winning bid is not considered as dissipated rent, but higher when it is considered as dissipated rent.
Proof: For part (a), Hillman and Riley (1989) show that
i.e., E Ã equals ðn À 1Þ=n times the harmonic mean of the players' valuations. Using (4) (with m ¼ n) and (i) and (iii) of Theorem 1, it follows that in our modelÊ E ¼ P jê e j is equal to ðn À 1Þ=n times the harmonic mean of the numbers ðv 1 À bðnÞÞ; . . . ; ðv n À bðnÞÞ. Note that we can interpret ðv j À bðnÞÞ as a 'net' valuation of the prize by player j ¼ 1; . . . ; n. Since bðnÞ > 0, it follows that 0 <Ê E < E Ã . Further, since bðnÞ < v j =2 for all j, we have v j À bðnÞ > v j =2 for all j, which implies that E Ã < 2Ê E. Hence, we have 0
ÞÞ. This implies (c). For (d), note that total rent dissipation in the standard model is E Ã . In our model, rent dissipation when the winning bid is counted as dissipated rent, equalsb b þÊ E ¼ 2Ê E > E Ã : When the winning bid is not counted as dissipated rent, it isÊ E < E Ã : ( Intuitively, since all players submit the same bid, in equilibrium our contest boils down to a standard rent-seeking contest in which the prize for player i is v i À b rather than v i . In that sense, our model is formally identical to a rent-seeking contest where the winner has to pay some fixed tax b on his prize. However, that tax is determined endogenously in our model. Since the prize is now worth less for all players, they also exert less effort, hence (b). In a standard contest, equilibrium probabilities of winning are unaffected when all prizes are multiplied by the same factor c: However, a fixed tax b has a relatively stronger effect on a player with a low v i than it has on a player with a large v i : Therefore, the player with the lowest v i now has an even lower probability of winning, whereas the player with the highest v i has a higher win probability. This explains (c).
So far, we have assumed that all players are active. Suppose that is no longer necessarily the case, and that we allow for the possibility that in equilibrium not all n players are active. We then have:
Corollary 2: If all n players are active in the equilibrium of our model with bids, then they are also active in the equilibrium of the standard model without bids.
Proof: In the standard model all n players are active in equilibrium iff E Ã < v n . In our model all n players are active in equilibrium iff E E þ bðnÞ < v n . But since bðnÞ ¼Ê E; this implies 2Ê E < v n : With E Ã < 2Ê E; this condition is more restrictive than E Ã < v n ; which establishes the result.
(
Asymmetric Valuations and Inactive Players
Consider the standard rent-seeking model (3) with n players and asymmetric valuations. As shown by Hillman and Riley (1989, pp. 33 and 34) , if the valuations of the players in this model are too asymmetric, then the players with the relatively low valuations are not active in equilibrium. To illustrate this, these authors discuss in some detail the case where the valuations are geometrically declining. Doing the same for our model, suppose that v jþ1 ¼ xv j , j ¼ 1; . . . ; n À 1, with 0 x 1. If x ¼ 1, all valuations are equal, and it can be shown that all n players are active in equilibrium (see Corollary 3 in Sect. 4.). Next, we decrease x by steps of 0:001. Doing so, the valuations become increasingly more asymmetric. At a certain point, the player with the lowest valuation becomes inactive. In Table 1 , we present for a number of values of n the critical value of x below which the player with the lowest valuation becomes inactive. In Table 1 , we also give the total rent dissipation P jê e j þ bðnÞ as a fraction of the highest valuation v 1 , evaluated at the critical value of x. If n increases, the size of the critical value of x rapidly moves towards 1. A qualitatively similar conclusion is obtained by Hillman and Riley (1989 , Table 1 ) for the standard rentseeking contest with geometrically declining valuations.
The Case of n Equal Valuations
Returning to model (2), consider the case in which all players have the same valuation. We then obtain the following result from Theorem 1.
Corollary 3: Take the model (2) with n > 1 players. If v i ¼ v; 8i, then the unique equilibrium bids and efforts are given by:
Proof: See the Appendix.
( For this case, we do have explicit solutions forb b i andê e i : Therefore, we can explicitly characterize the extent of rent dissipation in equilibrium. If the winning bid is considered as dissipated rent, then total rent dissipation is 2 3 v with n ¼ 2; and it strictly increases to v as n goes to infinity. If the winning bid is not considered as dissipated rent, then total rent dissipation is 1 3 v with n ¼ 2; and it strictly increases to 1 2 v as n goes to infinity. For the corresponding standard rent-seeking model, equilibrium efforts are e Ã i ¼ e Ã ¼ ðn À 1Þv=n 2 ; 8i, and expected payoffs p Ã i ¼ v=n 2 ; see Hillman and Riley (1989) . In our model, using Corollary 3, In a regular (first-price) auction, it is easy to see that each player would bid the common valuation of the prize (v), leaving expected payoffs equal to zero. Therefore, in our model, expected payoffs for contestants are higher than in a regular auction, but lower than in a standard rent-seeking contest.
The Case of Two Players
Next, we return to the general model (2) in which valuations are allowed to differ, but restrict our attention to the case of two contestants, thus n ¼ 2. We then have the following result from Theorem 1.
Corollary 4: Take the model (2) with n ¼ 2 players. The unique equilibrium bids and efforts are given by: 
Observe that
Thus, rent dissipation is maximized when q ¼ 1 2 ; i.e., when the two valuations are equal. Further, @D=@q < 0 for all q 2 ð 1 2 ; 1Þ. Therefore, with two players, we have that more equal valuations lead to higher total rent dissipation. 7 This result does not hinge on the definition of rent dissipation. When we also take the winning bid into account, total rent dissipation simply equals
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a model that introduces bids in a rent-seeking contest. In our model, the probability that a player wins the prize depends not only on the amount of effort exerted, but also on the bid submitted. The bid only has to be paid if the player wins the prize, the effort outlays are sunk. We showed the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for that model. Further, in that equilibrium, all active players submit the same bid, regardless of their valuation. Total efforts equal that bid. Moreover, we found underdissipation of rent. For the two player case, we showed that the extent of total rent dissipation is strictly decreasing in the extent of asymmetry in valuations. Clearly, the contest success function we consider, is rather specific. Yet, it corresponds to, and can be considered as a generalization of, the 7 Nti (1999) uses another approach to study how the extent of asymmetry in valuation influences total rent dissipation. Applied to our model, without loss of generality, assume again that v 1 ! v 2 , and write v 2 ¼ kv 1 ; with k 1: We then have
Observe that @D=@k > 0: Thus, the more equal valuations are (i.e., the higher k is), the higher total rent dissipation. Yet, this analysis is in terms of a fixed v 1 : More equal valuations then imply a higher v 2 ; while keeping v 1 fixed. In this analysis, increased rent dissipation is not so much due to lower asymmetry, but rather to a higher v 2 : This can be seen as follows. Rather than writing v 2 ¼ kv 1 ; we can also write v 1 ¼ lv 2 ; with l ! 1: We then have
Now, @D=@l > 0: Thus, this suggests that having more equal valuations (i.e., lower l) leads to lower dissipation, since we now do the analysis in terms of a fixed v 2 rather than a fixed v 1 : Our own approach circumvents the above scale effects and leads to unambiguous results. Finally, we remark that the scale effects also do not arise if we analyse total rent dissipation as a fraction of the highest valuation v 1 .
kind of success functions used in the standard rent-seeking literature. For a more general specification, the analysis soon becomes intractable. In a working paper (Haan and Schoonbeek, 2000) , we also consider a more general case, with the contest success function given by b
, with a and b given positive parameters. It turns out that then the equilibrium also has a natural relation between bids and efforts: the sum of all individual ratios of effort and bid now equals the ratio of the parameters associated with efforts and bids, i.e. P j ðê e j =b b j Þ ¼ b=a. Further, for the case with equal valuations, again there is always underdissipation of rent.
Appendix
We first state the first-order conditions for an interior solution of player i 0 s maximization problem, given bids b j and efforts e j ðj 6 ¼ iÞ of his rivals:
In stating these, we implicitly assume P j6 ¼i b j e j > 0. Next, we present three lemma's that will be used in the proofs of Theorem 1 and Corollaries 3 and 4. Lemma 1 characterizes the optimal bid and effort of player i, given bids and efforts of the other players.
Lemma 1: Take the model with n > 1 players. Consider player i. Let c i ¼ P j6 ¼i b j e j > 0. Then the optimal bid and effort of player i,b b i andẽ e i , are as follows: 
Moreover, using (A.3) and (A.5), we have
e i > 0; i.e., the expected payoff is strictly
if and only if c i < ðv i =2Þ 2 . The proof of the lemma now follows directly. ( Lemma 2: Consider for n ¼ 2 the function h 2 ðbÞ as defined in (4), with v 1 ! v 2 . The unique root bð2Þ of h 2 ðbÞ is given by
ðA:7Þ and satisfies bð2Þ < v 2 =2.
Proof: Straightforward manipulations show that bð2Þ is given by (A.7).
We then have to show that bð2Þ < v 2 =2, i.e., v 2 À 2bð2Þ > 0. Now,
For this expression to be positive, we need Moreover, if such an equilibrium exists, then it is the unique equilibrium in which all players participate, and the bids and efforts satisfy:
(iii) P n i¼1ê e i ¼ bðnÞ.
Proof: First, assume that ðb b 1 ; . . . ;b b n ;ê e 1 ; . . . ;ê e n Þ is an equilibrium witĥ b b i > 0 andê e i > 0, 8i: We then have to show that bðnÞ < v n =2, that there cannot exist another equilibrium in which all n players are active, and that the given equilibrium bids and efforts satisfy (i), (ii) and (iii) of the lemma. Note that, using (A.1) and (A.2), in the given equilibrium we must haveb b i < v i =2, 8i. Evaluated in the given equilibrium, (A.1) implies The RHS of (A.11) is a constant, independent of i. Thus we can writeb b for the bid of each player. Hence, the conditionb 
From (A.14),b b is a root of h n ðbÞ of (4). Since h n ðbÞ has a unique root, b b ¼ bðnÞ, and we must have bðnÞ < v n =2. Next, (i) of the lemma is now obvious, and (ii) and (iii) follow, respectively, from (A.13) and (A.12). Because bðnÞ is the unique root of h n ðbÞ, there cannot exist another equilibrium in which all n players are active. Next, assume that bðnÞ < v n =2. We then have to prove that there exists an equilibrium in which all n players are active, and that its bids and efforts are given by (i) and (ii) of the lemma ((iii) is then automatically satisfied). Note that these satisfyb b i > 0 andê e i > 0, 8i. It remains to be shown that each player i maximizes his expected payoff by choosing b i ¼ bðnÞ and e i ¼ê e i , given the rivals' choicesb b j andê e j (j 6 ¼ i). Consider c i ¼ P j6 ¼ib b jê e j . Note that c i > 0. Further,
Rewriting h n ðbðnÞÞ ¼ 0, it follows that
Combining results, we thus derive that Step 1: First, we show that there is no equilibrium in which only one agent is active. Suppose there is such an equilibrium and, without loss of generality, it is given by ðb 1 Þ, and the original situation is not an equilibrium. We have a contradiction. In the remainder, we can therefore concentrate on (candidate) equilibria with more than 1 player active.
Step 2: Next, we show that in an equilibrium in which some player s is active, necessarily all players 1; . . . ; s À 1 are active as well. Suppose there is an equilibrium ðb Ã 1 ; . . . ; b Ã n ; e Ã 1 ; . . . ; e Ã n Þ in which exactly t players are active, with 1 < t < n, and in which both there is a player s who is active and a player r with v r ! v s who is inactive. We will derive a contradiction. Denote the set of active players in the given equilibrium as T . Consider the hypothetical contest that is obtained from our original contest with n players by removing the n À t players with i = 2 T . Removing these non-active players does not affect the incentives of the active players in the equilibrium. Hence, for this hypothetical contest, the bids and efforts b Ã i and e Ã i with i 2 T must constitute an equilibrium. Noting that all t players are active in this equilibrium, we conclude from Lemma 3 that b Ã i ¼ bðtÞ and
Returning to the original contest with n players, consider now player r. Using the notation of Lemma 1, c r ¼ Step 3: Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which the set of active players is S ¼ f1; . . . ; sg for some 1 < s n. We show that there cannot exist another equilibrium in which the set of active players is a strict subset of S: Without loss of generality, take s ¼ n, and assume ðb Step 4: Using steps 1, 2 and 3, we know that if there exists an equilibrium, in this equilibrium either all players are active, or there is a player with a 'critical' valuation such that all players with a valuation larger than or equal to this critical valuation are active, whereas all players with a lower valuation are inactive. Also, if the equilibrium exists, it must be unique.
Using Lemmas 1 and 3, it follows that the proof of Theorem 1 is completed if we demonstrate that there exists a value k 2 ð1; n such that (a) bðkÞ < v k =2, and (b) if k < n, we also have bðkÞ ! v kþ1 =2. By doing so, we show the existence of an equilibrium in which, in case k ¼ n, all n players are active, while in case k < n, the players 1; . . . ; k are active and the players k þ 1; . . . ; n are not. First, note that Lemma 2 implies that bð2Þ < v 2 =2: So, there is at least one t such that bðtÞ < v t =2: Second, suppose that there does not exist a value k satisfying (a) and (b), i.e. suppose that the contest has no equilibrium. Then both (i) we must have bðnÞ ! v n =2 (use Lemma 3), and (ii) for all t < n such that bðtÞ < v t =2; we must have bðtÞ < v tþ1 =2 (use (a) and (b) mentioned above). We will derive a contradiction. Consider (ii) and take a t Ã < n such that bðt Ã Þ < v t Ã =2: According to (ii), this implies bðt Ã Þ < v t Ã þ1 =2, thus h t Ã ðv t Ã þ1 =2Þ > 0. Since h t Ã ðv t Ã þ1 =2Þ ¼ h t Ã þ1 ðv t Ã þ1 =2Þ, this implies h t Ã þ1 ðv t Ã þ1 =2Þ > 0, thus bðt Ã þ 1Þ < v t Ã þ1 =2. If t Ã þ 1 ¼ n, then we have a contradiction with (i). If t Ã þ 1 < n, by induction, repeating the argument finally implies bðnÞ < v n =2; which again violates (i). Thus, (i) and (ii) cannot be both satisfied, which proves Theorem 1.
( Proof of Corollary 3: Using v i ¼ v, 8i, it follows that the root bðnÞ of the function h n ðbÞ equals bðnÞ ¼ ðn À 1Þv=ð2n À 1Þ, thus bðnÞ < v=2. Part (i) of the corollary then follows from (i) of Theorem 1. Invoking symmetry,ê e i ¼ê e, 8i, which implies (ii). (
Proof of Corollary 4:
The proof follows directly from Lemma 2 and Theorem 1. 
